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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHILIPPINES’ ANTITERROR LAW—SUAVITER IN MODO, FORTITER IN RE1

Brent H. Lyew†
Abstract: The Philippines is rife with competing struggles for rights of selfdetermination and international terrorist networks. For years, the Philippine government
prosecuted suspected terrorists without an anti-terror law. The absence of an express
criminal violation for acts of terrorism led to a blurred distinction between punishing
terrorists and punishing secessionists. Responding to public outcry that the Philippine
government was violating human rights by punishing secessionists unjustly, the United
Nations conducted an investigation. This investigation led to the placement of the
Philippine government on the United Nations’ human rights watch list. The Philippine
legislature, shortly thereafter, passed the Human Security Act of 2007 (“HSA”). This law
codified the acts punishable as crimes of terrorism. Since the HSA’s passage, five
prominent advocacy groups petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to strike down the
anti-terror law as unconstitutional for being overly vague and unjustly intruding on
individual rights. This comment analyzes the lawfulness of the HSA.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism plagues the Philippines. On May 23, 1976, six hijackers
took control of a commercial airliner and, after demands were not met,
detonated grenades that exploded the plane on a runway in the Philippines.2
This hijacking was one of the Philippines’ earliest terror attacks that incurred
international reverberations. 3 International terrorists soon after infiltrated
the Philippines and established operational networks.4 Attacks escalated5 In
1991, terrorists attempted to bomb the United States’ (“U.S.”) embassy in
† Juris Doctor expected 2010. The author would like to thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal and Prof. Joel Ngugi for his guidance in the development of this comment. .
1
Latin for: “Gently in manner, strongly in deed.” OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (P.G.W. Glare ed.
1982). Letter from Lord Chesterfield to his son, in Henry Belfield, Lord Chesterfield's Letters To His Son
and Godson, Selected, at 125-26 (1897) (“The suaviter in modo alone would degenerate and sink into a
mean, timid complaisance and passiveness, if not supported and dignified by the fortiter in re, which would
also run into impetuosity and brutality, if not tempered and softened by the suaviter in modo: however, they
are seldom united.”)…
2
Aviation Safety Network, Hijacking Description: 23 May 1976, http://aviationsafety.net/database/record.php?id=19760523-1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
3
See ROMULO C. SUPAPO, U.S.-PHILIPPINE SECURITY RELATIONS: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
GLOBAL
WAR
ON
TERRORISM
2
(2004),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424307&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
4
Id. at 5.
5
See Esaquito P. Manalo, The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group, Naval
Post Graduate School 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429991&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited
Oct. 8, 2009).
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Manila, 6 and since 2000, terrorist acts in the Philippines have killed or
injured more than 1,700 people.7 The attacks included bombings of “buses
carrying workers, food markets where people were shopping, airports where
relatives were waiting for loved ones, and ferry boats carrying families.”8
The Philippine government responded to the growing terrorist problem with
military force. No law, however, identified the acts that incurred terrorist
liability, nor specified the manner in which the acts were punishable.9 The
Philippine government’s fight against terrorists without an anti-terror law led
to many complaints of human rights abuses.10
After the United Nations (“U.N.”) substantiated complaints of human
rights abuses, 11 the Philippine legislature attempted an about-face by
enacting the Human Security Act of 2007 (“HSA”). 12 The HSA made
specific acts punishable as acts of terrorism and gave courts the authority to
determine when a suspect’s actions qualified as acts of terrorism.13 Shortly
after the HSA’s passage, five prominent advocacy groups petitioned the
6

SUPAPO, supra note 3, at 2.
Philippines: Extremist Groups Target Civilians, More Than 1,700 Killed and Injured in Bombings
and
Kidnappings,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
July
29,
2007,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/07/29/philippines-extremist-groups-target-civilians (last visited Oct. 8,
2009).
8
Carlos H. Conde, 400 Killed by Terrorism in Philippines since 2000, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/world/asia/30iht-phils.4.6902202.html.
9
See Manalo, supra note 5, at 12-13, 23-24.
10
See Aileen Estoquia, Critics Warn President vs Rushing Anti-Terror Bill, BULATLAT, May 15,
2005, available at http://www.bulatlat.com/news/5-14/5-14-atb.htm; see also Cher S. Jimenez, Deadly
Dirty
Work
in
the
Philippines,
ASIA
TIMES
ONLINE,
Feb.
13,
2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IB13Ae01.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (explaining that
“[p]olitical killings in the Philippines have escalated into a full-blown international issue.”).
11
U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 30-33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2, 37
(April 16, 2008) (prepared by Philip Alston) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council on the Promotion
and Protection of All Human Rights].
12
Official Website of the Office of the Solicitor General – Republic of the Philippines, OSG Defends
Human Security Act, http://www.osg.gov.ph/default.asp?id=40&ACT=5&content=87&mnu=40 (last
visited Oct. 8, 2009).
13
KENNETH PEREIRE, INT'L CTR. FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH, ANALYSIS
AND REVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINES HUMAN SECURITY ACT 2007 (Mar. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Legislative%20Response/revisedPhilippines%20CT%20LAW2007newi.pdf; see
also Annie Rose A. Laborte, Supreme Court Justice Speaks on the Anti-Terrorism Law, SUP. CT. OF THE
PHIL.
COURT
NEWS
FLASH,
(May
9,
2007),
available
at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2007/05/05090702.php (Supreme Court Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez explaining that the HSA requires the Court to ponder: “[t]o whom and to
what acts is the law directed” and whether “the law is a potent tool to fight terrorism or to curtail
fundamental freedom.”).
7
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Philippine Supreme Court to strike down the law.14 These groups argue that
the Philippine Supreme Court should nullify the HSA because it is
unconstitutionally vague and violative of individual rights.15 The Philippine
Supreme Court has yet to rule on these cases.
This comment analyzes the constitutionality of the HSA. Part II
provides a historical background of terrorism in the Philippines and observes
the Philippine government’s responses that led to the passage of the HSA.
Part III examines whether the HSA is unconstitutionally vague in its
definition of a punishable terrorist act, and Part IV explores whether the
HSA impermissibly infringes on individual rights. Last, Part V examines
policy considerations.
II.

THE HSA IS THE PHILIPPINES’ SOLUTION TO STOPPING TERRORISM
WHILE CURBING GOVERNMENTAL ABUSE OF POWER

For years, the Philippine government used its military to quell
revolutionary factions. 16
As terrorist networks grew and became
increasingly problematic, the Philippine government used its military to
fight concurrently against secessionists and terrorists.17 This response led to
the U.N. taking action and the Philippine government passing the HSA, a
law that distinguished between acts of secession and acts of terrorism.
A.

Muslim Secessionism in Mindanao Set the Stage for the Incursion of
International Terrorists

Violent struggle for secession in the Philippines provided fertile
ground for the embedment of international terrorists. At the turn of the
twentieth century, the U.S. took control of the Philippines and occupied it
under the Treaty of Paris.18 After establishing sovereignty,19 the U.S. pushed
for a policy that encouraged Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas, the
northern and central regions of the Philippines, to colonize the agricultural
14

Gemma Bagayaua, 5 Petitions Ask Court to Nullify Anti-Terror Law, NEWS BREAK, Sept. 10,
2007,
available
at
http://www.newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3696&Itemid=88889005.
15
Id.
16
Reuters AlertNet, Long-Running Muslim and Communist Insurgencies, REUTERS ALERT NET, Apr.
12, 2008, available at http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/PH_SEP.htm?v=in_detail.
17
See Manalo, supra note 5, at 12-13, 23-24, 28-30.
18
Ricardo A. David Jr., The Causes and Prospect of the Southern Philippines Secessionist
Movement 3 (Dec. 2003) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/David03.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2009).
19
Id. at 40-42.
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lands in Mindanao, the predominately Muslim southern region of the
Philippines.20
This land settlement policy has caused conflict since 1898. 21 The
policy diluted the existing aboriginal people’s land ownership. 22 The
original Mindanaons, known as the Moros, resented the land settlement
policy23 and since 1898, have fought for independence.24 By the late 1960s,
the Moros began to form militias to fight the northern Christian settlers.25
This conflict, still ongoing, has cost approximately 160,000 lives.26
As the Moros and other Filipino Muslims fought for rights of selfdetermination in Mindanao, 27 the political structure deteriorated, which
permitted incursion of international terrorists.28 Using military force to fight
the rebelling Muslim militias,29the Philippine government’s use of tactical
offensives displaced over two million persons.30 These military offensives
catalyzed a growth of socio-economic and political grievances that led to an
unstable social climate. 31 This instability, coupled with “weak political
institutions, decentralized politics, poor resources, and . . . endemic
corruption [in the government],”32 made Mindanao an ideal environment for
the settlement of international terrorists. 33 Terrorist groups, such as AlQa’ida, 34 flocked to the aid of the suppressed insurgent militias and
established the Mindanao region as an operation base.35
20

Id.
Id.
22
See id. at 40-42.
23
Id. at 66.
24
See David, supra note 18, at 40-42.
25
Id. at 59-60.
26
See Reuters AlertNet, supra note 16.
27
See David, supra note 18, at 41-42, 49-50.
28
See Reuters AlertNet, supra note 16.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See SUPAPO, supra note 3, at 5.
32
See Manalo, supra note 5, at 17-18.
33
Id.
34
Al-Qa’ida is an “international terrorist network” that was “[e]stablished around 1988 by bin
Laden.” Al-Qa’ida’s “current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working
with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’ and expelling Westerners
and
non-Muslims
from
Muslim
countries.”
Global
Security,
Al-Qaeda
(2006),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
35
See Preeti Bhattacharji, Terrorism Havens: Philippines, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2008),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/ (explaining that the U.S. State Department considers the
southern Philippines a “terrorist safe haven,” and Al-Qa’ida operates in the Philippines through a handful
of regional and local organizations); see also Zachary Abuza, Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu
Sayyaf,
STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE
(2005),
available
at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/print.cfm?q=625 (explaining the Mindanao region is a
base for terrorist operations).
21
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The Philippine Government’s Use of Military Force to Fight Terrorism
Made the HSA a Necessity

The Philippine government’s use of broad military force to fight its
terrorist problem eventually led to U.N. action and the Philippine’s adoption
of the HSA. In 2006, the Philippine government scheduled thirty-seven joint
exercises with the U.S. military to fight terrorism. 36 These exercises
included Balikatan—a bilateral military operation precisely aimed at rooting
out international terrorists. 37 The military offensives produced some
victories that slowed the growing terrorist footprint, 38 but the Philippine
government’s application of military force without an anti-terror law
permitted abuses of power.39
These abuses spurred many complaints of human rights violations.40
Until the passage of the HSA, military commanders had unilateral authority
to determine which persons to target as terrorists.41 Human rights groups
contend military commanders abused their discretion and estimate during
President Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration42 “at least 830 people [were]
killed in an extrajudicial fashion, including 365 mostly left-leaning political
and social activists, . . . journalists, judges, and lawyers known to be
sympathetic to leftist causes.” 43 These extrajudicial killings were not all
caused exclusively by the Philippine government’s fight against terrorism,
but they were “committed by death squads . . . [that] operate[d] under the
protective umbrella of regional [Mindanao] military commands” aimed at
stopping terrorism.44
A commission led by former Philippine Supreme Court Justice Jose
Melo confirmed that members of the military were responsible for the
“majority” of the extrajudicial killings. 45 A formal U.N. investigation
36

See Bhattacharji, supra note 35.
Id.
See
CIA
World
Fact
Book,
Philippines
(2008),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html.
39
See Jimenez, supra note 10.
40
See Bhattacharji, supra note 35.
41
Mouloud Boumghar, Frédéric Ceuppens & Nabeel Rajab, INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION:
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, FIGHTING TERROR OR TERRORIZING? 9-10 (International
Federation for Human Rights Apr. 2008), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ph493a.pdf.
42
President Macapagal-Arroyo “was sworn in as the 14th President of the Philippines on January 20,
2001.”
AsianInfo.org, Confusion and Hope, Politics in the Philippines (2008),
http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/issues/gloria_macapagal.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
43
See Jimenez, supra note 10.
44
James Petras and Robin Eastman-Abaya, Philippines: The Killing Fields of Asia (2006),
http://petras.lahaine.org/articulo.php?c=1&more=1&p=1660 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
45
See Jimenez, supra note 10.
37
38
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subsequently affirmed the Melo Commission’s findings,46 and as a result, the
U.N. placed the Philippine government on its human rights watch list.47 The
Philippine government then enacted the HSA to protect its people’s “basic
rights and fundamental liberties” while continuing its fight against
terrorism. 48 The HSA codified the specific acts punishable as crimes of
terrorism, delegated authority to the courts to determine when acts qualified
as being punishable, and made other certain acts also punishable as abuses of
governmental power.49
C.

Advocacy Groups Petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to Strike
the HSA for Being Unconstitutionally Vague

Dubious of the law and deeply afraid of the far-reaching and
unfettered power of the government as experienced by the alleged officially
sanctioned extrajudicial killings, five prominent advocacy groups 50
petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to strike the HSA.51 Under writs of
certiorari for prohibition and mandamus,52 these advocacy groups argue the
46

See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 11.
Nikko Dizon, PNP: Extrajudicial killings fell by 83% in 2007, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Jan.
14, 2008, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080114-112184/PNP-Extrajudicialkillings-fell-by-83-in-2007 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
48
An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep.
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.), available at http://www.ops.gov.ph/records/ra_no9372.htm.
49
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., THE MAKING OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 39 (2007).
50
The five prominent advocacy groups were: (1) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or New Patriotic
Alliance, “a nationwide alliance of people’s organizations with members from the ranks of workers,
farmers, youth, women, urban poor, indigenous peoples, church people, [and] human rights defenders”
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bayan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 6 (July 17, 2007), available at
http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_petition.pdf); (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita (Aug. 2007), available at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114
); (3) the Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc., which works toward the “constructive
engagement of rebel groups in peace processes, human rights, international humanitarian law, and other
areas of human security” (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc. v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, 4 (2007), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_SC_Petition.pdf); (4) Kilusang
Mayo Uno, which “operates as a labor center espousing genuine, militant, and nationalist trade unionism”
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Eduardo Ermita, 3 (July 2007), available at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=111
); and (5) KARAPATAN, an independent human rights organization involved in documenting and
providing legal support to victims of human rights abuses (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Karapatan v.
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo,
9
&
13
(Aug.
6,
2007),
available
at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=showdown&id=11
3).
51
See Bagayaua, supra note 14.
52
Philippine Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the writ of certiorari for prohibition and mandamus,
authorizes the Philippine Supreme Court to nullify the HSA based on a grave abuse of discretion by
Philippine lawmakers. See R. Civ. P. 65, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (1997) (Phil.), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/specialcivilactions.htm#RULE%2065.
47
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HSA is a legitimization for the Philippine government to continue violating
constitutionally protected individual rights.53 The Philippine Supreme Court
has not accepted any of these cases.54 The Court’s refusal to rule on the
HSA permitted the anti-terror law to gain notoriety as “one of the
[Philippines’] most controversial laws passed in this decade—if not in this
century.”55
III.

THE HSA’S DEFINITION OF TERRORISM IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VIABLE

At the heart of the five petitions before the Philippine Supreme Court
is criticism that the HSA contains an overly vague definition of terrorism.56
The HSA defines a terrorist act by listing a set of specific acts incorporated
from other statutes and presidential decrees, and requires that these acts
create “a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.” 57 Some of the acts listed are piracy, coup d’état, murder,
kidnapping, arson, hijacking, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. 58
The petitioners characterize this definition as overly vague and made so with
intent to permit continued arbitrary punishment of “legitimate expressions of
political dissent and social protest.” 59 This section analyzes whether the
HSA’s definition of a punishable act of terrorism is unconstitutionally vague.
A vagueness challenge to a statute proceeds in one of two ways: 1) a
court can examine whether the statute is vague on its face; or 2) a court can
examine the statute as it is applied in a particular case that involves a
specific set of facts. 60 The Philippine Constitution also incorporates
international law into Philippine domestic law,61 so the Philippine Supreme
Court may also analyze the HSA against international norms. This section
examines the HSA’s definition under all three possible analyses: Part A
53

Id.
Tetch Torres, Supreme Court Asked to Declare Anti-Terror Law Unconstitutional, INQUIRER.NET,
Sept. 19, 2007, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=89449 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009).
55
Alexander Remollino, Juan Ponce Enrile: Martial Law Architect, HSA Sponsor, WORLD PROUT
ASSEMBLY (July 24, 2007), http://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2007/07/juan_ponce_enri.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
56
See Bagayaua, supra note 14.
57
An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep.
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.).
58
Id.
59
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT: RECIPE FOR UNDECLARED
MARTIAL LAW 3 (2007), available at http://www.bayan.ph/downloads/primerHSA.pdf.
60
RUFUS RODRIGUEZ, THE CRIME OF PLUNDER IN THE PHILIPPINES 363 (2002).
61
CONST. (1987), Art. III § 2 (Phil), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/philsupremelaw2.html.
54
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examines whether the definition is facially unconstitutional; Part B explores
an applied challenge; and Part C determines whether the HSA’s definition
violates international law.
A.

The HSA’s Vagueness Does Not Render It Facially Unconstitutional

The five petitions before the Philippine Supreme Court disputing the
HSA’s vagueness are all facial challenges. As facial challenges, the
petitioners lack factual cases where a trier of fact may determine whether the
law provided adequate notice to a suspected violator of the prohibited
action.62 The petitioners accordingly argue the HSA is unconstitutional in
every application. 63 Four of the five complaints contend the HSA’s
definition of terrorism is unlawfully vague and petition the Philippine
Supreme Court to strike the HSA using the void-for-vagueness doctrine.64
Subpart 1 explains why the Philippine Supreme Court will most likely not
apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine; Subpart 2 explains why the HSA
passes the void-for-vagueness test even if the Court applies the void-forvagueness doctrine; and Subpart 3 examines why the Court would uphold
the HSA despite some vagueness in the law’s definition of terrorism.
1.

The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine Is Inapplicable to the HSA

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is limited in its scope of application.
The doctrine provides “that what makes a statute susceptible to [void-forvagueness] is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.”65 The petitioners argue the Philippine Supreme
62
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition at 7, Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552 (July 16, 2007). (Phil.), available at
http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_SC_Petition.pdf.
63
Id.
64
Accord Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, Bayan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, (July
16, 2007). (Phil.), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_petition.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
Prohibition, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Eduardo Ermita, (July 2007). (Phil), available at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=111;
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, Karapatan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, (Aug. 6, 2007).
(Phil)
available
at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=showdown&id=11
3; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, (Aug. 2007). (Phil),
available
at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114.
65
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693,
20
SCRA
849.
(July
31,
1967).
(Phil.),
available
at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1967/jul1967/gr_l-24693_1967.php (Connally v.
General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
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Court should apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine to strike the HSA for
two reasons. First, the petitioners argue the doctrine applies because the
HSA restricts freedom of speech. 66 The second argument lobbies the
Philippine Supreme Court to expand the void-for-vagueness doctrine’s
application to criminal statutes because it is the best test to determine
statutory unconstitutional vagueness.67
The petitioners find support in Philippine Supreme Court’s dissents.68
In the 2001 case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Justice Kapunan argued in a
dissent that a vagueness challenge to a penal statute should be allowed
because an unconstitutionally vague penal statute involves a “deprivation of
liberty, and even life, which inarguably, are rights as important as, if not
more than, free speech.”69 In the 2004 case of Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,
Justice Tinga, also in a dissent, noted “‘the void-for-vagueness doctrine’
must not only apply to free-speech cases but also, if not with greater force,
to penal statutes.” 70 These dissents, however, are overshadowed by the
majority opinions.
The likelihood is that the Philippine Supreme Court will follow its
precedent and not apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The Court’s case
law currently restricts the void-for-vagueness doctrine to free-speech cases,
and the HSA is not speech limiting legislation. The Philippine Supreme
Court’s most recent address of whether the void-for-vagueness doctrine
applies to penal statutes was in the 2008 case of Carlos Romualdez and
Erlinda Romualdez, v. Commission on Elections and Dennis Garay. Here,
the Philippine Supreme Court refused to apply the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to criminal statutes, reasoning that an overextension of the doctrine
“would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts.” 71 The Court explained, “[s]uch invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of ‘actual case and
controversy’ and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
66
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, 15 (Aug.
2007).
(Phil.),
available
at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114.
67
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Eduardo Ermita, 30-31
(July
2007).
(Phil.),
available
at
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=111.
68
Id.
69
Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560 (S.C., Nov. 19, 2001). (Phil.) (Kapunan, J.,
dissenting), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/148560.htm.
70
Alfredo Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259 (S.C., July 29, 2004). (Phil.), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jul2004/gr_152259_2004.html.
71
Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez, v. Comm’n on Elections and Dennis Garay, G.R. No.
167011
(S.C.,
Dec.
11,
2008).
(Phil),
available
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having no factual concreteness.”72 Thus, unless the Court diverges from its
precedent, it will not apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine to the HSA.
2.

The HSA Would Pass the Test Set Out Under the Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine

Assuming the Philippine Supreme Court applies the void-forvagueness doctrine, the HSA is nevertheless within constitutional limits.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine makes the HSA unconstitutional only if it is
vague “in all its possible applications.” 73 In the 2004 case of Alfredo
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, the Philippine Supreme Court explained that
an unconstitutionally vague law “lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in
its application.”74 Four years later, in Romulo Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Philippine Supreme
Court provided that a law is void for vagueness when it fails to give “fair
notice of the conduct to avoid, and it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out [the law’s] provisions.”75 The HSA does not meet
these criteria.
Contrary to the petitioners’ arguments, the HSA passes the void-forvagueness test because it is not vague “in all its possible applications.”76
The HSA defines an act of terrorism by enumerating a finite list of criminal
acts that are already punishable in the Revised Penal Code, Presidential
Decrees, or Republic Acts, and requires that the action create “a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.”77 This definition
permits a court to punish a violator so long as the violative act (actus reus) is
one of the HSA’s enumerated punishable acts, the violator possessed the
specific intent (mens rea) “to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand,” and there existed the attendant circumstances of
72
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Randolf David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (S.C., Mar. 3, 2006). (Phil.),
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“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace.”78 While
not drawing a bright line that distinctly demarks which acts are punishable,
the HSA requires the judiciary to determine when the requisite intent and
attendant circumstances exist to make the violative act a punishable act of
terrorism. This requirement dispels the petitioners’ challenged vagueness.
Using the plain meaning rule to interpret the HSA’s definition of a
punishable terrorist act, 79 the words’ meanings do not seem confusing to
“men of common intelligence” in all possible applications.80 An ordinary
reading suggests the HSA forbids certain acts aimed at creating “a state of
danger, panic, fear, or chaos to the general public or segment thereof [done
to coerce or intimidate] the government to do or refrain from doing an act.”81
While individual terms within the HSA’s definition are subject to
interpretation—narrow or broad—the entire definition, when read as a
whole, manifests comprehensible notice to an ordinary reader. The
cumulative effect therefore does not deprive an ordinary reader of fair notice
in every possible application. While the HSA is not void-for-vagueness
because the terms are sufficiently defined, the Court may also examine the
HSA to determine whether the HSA is so vague that the law cannot
accomplish its purpose.
3.

The Prospect of Abuse Does Not Warrant Invalidation

Apart from the void-for-vagueness test, the Philippine Supreme Court
may also analyze whether the HSA’s definition of terrorism is so vague that
it impedes the law’s purpose. The HSA also passes this inquiry. In the 2006
case of Randolf David v. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the Philippine
Supreme Court held “[t]he validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired.”82 The Court concluded “courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid although they may be abused in the manner of application.”83 The
HSA makes clear that its purpose is to “protect life, liberty, and property
78
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Republic of the Philippines v. Carlito Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 (S.C., Mar. 2, 2007). (Phil.),
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/march2007/158253.htm. (characterizing the plain
meaning rule in statutory interpretation as: “if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation”).
80
Carlos Romualdez, v. Comm’n on Elections and Dennis Garay, G.R. No. 167011 (S.C., Dec. 11,
2008). (Phil.), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/167011.htm.
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See PEREIRE, supra note 13, at 1.
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from acts of terrorism.”84 The HSA’s definition of terrorism accomplishes
this purpose because it provides notice that courts can punish specific acts as
crimes of terrorism if the violator possessed the necessary criminal intent,
and the required attendant circumstances existed. Therefore, despite
allegations that the Philippine government may be apt to abuse the HSA,85
such propensity does not warrant invalidation. While the HSA is likely
constitutional on its face, it may be challenged as unconstitutional when
applied to a specific set of facts. The following section explores an asapplied challenge.
B.

In an As-Applied Challenge, the HSA May Be Unconstitutionally
Vague If Wrongly Applied

Absent a factual case in which the Philippine Supreme Court may
determine the lawfulness of the HSA’s application, a case study is used here
to test an as-applied challenge. This examination shows that the lawfulness
of an as-applied challenge to the HSA is dependent on the facts of the
situation. The test case is a recent Philippine criminal case.
The case of Edgar de la Cruz Candule began on March 21, 2008.86
Police arrested Candule for illegal possession of a firearm. 87 Candule
alleges police tortured him during his arrest and incarceration, which caused
him to admit he owned the pistol seized and was a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (“CPP-NPA”). 88
On April 1, 2008, the prosecuting attorney amended Candule’s charge to
include a violation of the HSA. 89 The prosecutor charged Candule with
violating the HSA for:
[O]penly professing himself as a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA) and advocating the overthrow of the
84

An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep.
Act 9372 § 2 (2007) (Phil).
85
NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, OUTLINE OF CRITIQUE OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW KNOWN AS THE
HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 1 (2007), available at http://www.bayan.ph/downloads/CODAL%20
critique%20of%20the%20Anti-terrorism%20Law.pdf.
86
Aeta Recounts Nightmarish Encounter with the Philippines’s Anti-Terrorism Law, PINOY PRESS,
Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.pinoypress.net/2008/10/09/an-aetas-nightmarish-encounter-with-philippinessterrorism-law/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
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Id. The Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army is an internationally recognized
terrorist organization. NORIYUKI GATAGIRI, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, IN THE SPOTLIGHT: THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CPP) (2002), http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/cpp.cfm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009).
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See Aeta Recounts Nightmarish Encounter with the Philippines’s Anti-Terrorism Law, supra note
86.
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legitimate government by force of arms using unlicensed
firearms and ammunitions and by inciting others to commit acts
of rebellion thereby sowing and creating a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to their
demands.90
Applying the HSA’s definition of terrorism to Candule’s case, the
HSA makes clear which acts it prohibits. It is well established in the
“Philippines [that] no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute.”91 The
Philippine Supreme Court has required specificity in criminal statutes but
has also given wide latitude to the Philippine Congress.
In adjudicating vagueness challenges, the Philippine Supreme Court
has required a high threshold of unconstitutional vagueness for it to strike
down a law. In the en banc case of In re: Arsenio Gonzales v. Comm’n on
Elections, the Philippine Supreme Court held that a criminal law may be
struck if it “suffers from [a] fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness.”92
Arsenio Gonzales shows the vagueness threshold to be a high bar; the
Philippine Supreme Court determined that the law challenged was vague,
but the Court nevertheless upheld the law because other Filipino laws
defined the vague terms.93 Also, in the 2000 case of Sajul v. Sandiganbayan,
the Philippine Supreme Court reinforced its Dans v. People holding that a
penal statute is constitutional as long as it answers “the basic query [of]
‘[w]hat is the violation.’”94 The Court in Sajul provided, “[a]nything beyond
this, the ‘hows’ and the ‘whys,’ are evidentiary matters, which the law
cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case.”95
Applying the law to the HSA as applied in Candule’s situation, the
Philippine Supreme Court would have to determine whether the HSA
punishes the actions of owning a firearm and associating with the CPP-NPA.
The HSA is clear on this point. The HSA does punish unlawful possession
90
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Norma Dizon-Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, (S.C. July 11, 1994).
(Phil.) (citing United States v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725, 728 (1916)), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jul1994/gr_111426_1994.html.
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In re: Arsenio Gonzales v. Comm’n on Elections, G.R. No. L-27833 (S.C. Apr. 18, 1969). (Phil.),
available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/apr1969/gr_l-27833_1969.html.
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See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 243 (citing Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135294 (S.C.
Nov. 20, 2000). (Phil.)).
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of a firearm, but only when the act accompanies the required attendant
circumstances, and the perpetrator possessed the required specific intent.96
The HSA does not prohibit owning a firearm or associating with the
CPP-NPA. The evidence does not clearly support the charge that Candule
used the pistol to create “a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace.” 97 Any vagueness contained in differing
interpretations of the HSA’s wording, “widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace,”98 seem evidentiary—a matter of the “hows”
and “whys” rather than the “whats.”99
Additionally, there is no evidence that Candule possessed the required
specific criminal intent. Candule’s membership in the CPP-NPA does not
suffice to prove that while possessing the firearm he intended “to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.”100 The “basic query [of]
‘[w]hat is the violation’” 101 is therefore clear: the HSA is not prohibitive of
Candule’s actions because his possession of the firearm did not accompany
the requisite attendant circumstances. Other permeations of the facts,
however, may substantiate that Candule did possess the required specific
intent. Therefore, the constitutionality of the HSA in an as-applied challenge
hinges on the facts of the case. Nevertheless, indicia of definitional
vagueness in the HSA do not frustrate the law’s purpose. Because Philippine
domestic law incorporates international law, the following section analyzes
the HSA’s definitional vagueness against international standards.
C.

The HSA’s Definitional Vagueness Does Not Unconstitutionally
Violate International Law

The Philippine Supreme Court may also conduct an analysis of the
HSA in light of international law as integrated by the Philippine
Constitution.102 Article II of the Constitution states the Philippines “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
96

An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep.
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.) (referencing in part Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree
Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 243 (citing Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135294 (S.C.
Nov. 20, 2000). (Phil.)).
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An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep.
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Nov. 20, 2000). (Phil.)).
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the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.”103 In the 1949 Philippine Supreme
Court case of Kuroda v. Jalandoni, Chief Justice Moran interpreted Article II
to incorporate into Philippine law the Hague Convention, the Geneva
Conventions, and the “significant precedents of international
jurisprudence.” 104 The analysis here examines the international legal
disagreement on the definition of terrorism, evaluates the HSA with regard
to the most widely accepted international conventions, and finds that the
HSA comports.
International law lacks a consensual definition of which acts
comprehensively constitute acts of terrorism. 105
The fundamental
impediment to defining terrorism is a general disagreement on whether acts
related to rebellions or insurgencies are acts of terrorism.106 This impasse is
apparent in the October 2008 report of the Chairman of the Working Group
on Terrorism and in the March 2008 conclusion of the U.N. General
Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism.107 Both groups concluded without agreement.108 The definitional
disagreement on whether acts of terrorism include acts related to rebellions
or insurgencies manifests principally between the Arab and the Western
world’s uncompromising positions.
The Arab Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism and the Convention of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism believes the
definition of terrorism does not include acts related to struggles for liberation
and self-determination. 109 Contrarily, Western countries oppose absolute
exclusion and believe acts of terrorism should encompass greater
inclusivity.110
103
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The USA PATRIOT Act’s definition of terrorism exemplifies a broad
inclusion of most violent acts.111 Under the USA PATRIOT Act, a domestic
terrorist is any person who engages within the territorial jurisdiction of the
U.S. in illegal “acts dangerous to human life” with the purpose to “(i)
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.” 112 Broadly,
the USA PATRIOT Act includes as acts of terrorism all illegal “acts
dangerous to human life” performed to influence the U.S. government.113
Despite the stalemate between the East and the West, the U.N. has
promulgated some guidance. A 2004 U.N. report suggested the definition of
terrorism should include as elements: the use of force against civilians; the
use of force to intimidate civilians; or the use of force “to compel a
[g]overnment or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an
act.” 114 This report also stated that such a definition should include
provisions from the Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1566. 115 The Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit acts or
threats of violence aimed at spreading terror among a civilian population.116
The U.N. Security Resolution 1566 explicitly provides that the purpose of a
terrorist act is “to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group
of persons or particular persons, [or to] intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act.”117 Additionally, a 2005 report by the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan also provided guidance. The Secretary-General’s report “proposed to
define terrorism as ‘any action . . . intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a
111
See How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” ACLU, Dec. 6, 2002,
http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/14444leg20021206.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
112
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Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 376, § 802 (codified as amended in section
18 U.S.C. 2331(5)) (2001) (USA PATRIOT Act).
113
See How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” supra note 111.
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U.N. Gen. Assem. Rep., Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Gen.
Assem. Rep., Millennium Summit].
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[hereinafter U.N. Non-International Armed Conflicts Protocol, art 13 §2].
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S.C. Res. 1566, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004), available at
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population or compelling a government or an international organization to
do or abstain from doing any act.’”118
The HSA’s definition of a punishable terrorist act complies with these
guidelines. The HSA’s required attendant circumstances of “sowing and
creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace” and its mens rea requirement “to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand”119 conform to the 2004 U.N. report, which
suggests the definition of terrorism should prohibit the use of force against
civilians, the use of force to intimidate civilians, or the use of force “to
compel a [g]overnment . . . to do or abstain from doing an act.” 120 The
HSA’s definition also conforms with the Geneva Conventions because the
law prohibits acts or threats of violence aimed at spreading terror among the
Philippine population;121 comports with the U.N. Security Resolution 1566
because the law prohibits coercion of the Philippine government;122 and is
congruent with the Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 2005 proposed
definition.123 Therefore, the HSA’s definition of a terrorist act satisfies the
widely accepted provisions of international law. The following section
examines the HSA’s substantive measures.
IV.

THE HSA SURVIVES SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES

The second most prominent complaint against the HSA is it
unconstitutionally infringes on individual rights.124 This section explores the
constitutionality of the HSA’s detention and search and seizure provisions.
The petitioners argue the authority granted to law enforcers in the HSA to
detain suspected terrorists, limit confined individuals’ access to cell phones
and email, and to search and seize suspected terrorists’ communications and
118
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See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 117.
123
See Applegarth, supra note 118.
124
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bayan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, (July 17, 2007). (Phil.),
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(July
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financial property unjustly abridges constitutional liberties. Part A analyzes
the HSA against the Philippine jurisprudence’s three-part test of due process.
Part B then examines the legality of the HSA’s measures in light of
international law as interpreted by the Philippine Supreme Court.
A.

For an Invasive Statute to Be Constitutional, It Must Pass the Due
Process Three-Prong Test

The chief complaint is the HSA violates the constitutional right of due
process.125 The due process clause of the Philippine Constitution protects
against governmental deprivation of “life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”126 A noted authority on Philippine constitutional law, J.
Isagani Cruz, wrote, “[d]ue process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness
[from] the government . . . [and] the law [that] unreasonably deprives a
person of his life, liberty, or his property.”127 To determine whether a law
unconstitutionally curtails due process, the Philippine Supreme Court
adopted a three-part test: 1) the problem the law cures must affect the
“interests of the public generally”; 2) “the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the [law’s] purpose and not
unduly oppressive”; and 3) “[a] reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for [the law’s]
accomplishment.”128
1.

As Terrorism Afflicts All Filipinos, the HSA Affects the Interests of the
General Public

In punishing acts of terrorism, the HSA succeeds in the first prong of
the due process test: the problem addressed affects the general interests of
the public. Terrorism is a malignancy that afflicts the Filipino society as a
whole. 129 Terrorist attacks are not symptomatic of private interests, but
comprise an indiscriminate plague that has included murder in Filipino
markets, on public-transportation, and in other public meeting places. 130
125
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Reinforcing this conclusion, section two of the HSA provides that terrorism
is “a crime against [all] the Filipino people.”131 Thus, because the HSA is a
law passed to curb a societal ill, it passes the first criterion of the due process
test.
2.

The HSA’s Preventative Detention, House Arrest, and Search and
Seizure Measures Are Reasonably Necessary and Not Overly
Oppressive

The HSA also passes the second part of the due process test: its
means are reasonably necessary and not overly oppressive. The petitioners
find fault with the HSA’s provisions that authorize preventative detention;
house arrest; and search and seizure. Subpart a) analyzes whether the HSA’s
preventative detention provisions are reasonably necessary and not overly
oppressive; Subpart b) examines the HSA’s house arrest provisions; Subpart
c) tests the HSA’s search and seizure measures; and Subpart d) looks at the
HSA’s built-in punishments and protections that curb potential abuse.
a.

Preventative Detention

First, the petitioners contend the HSA’s authorization for law
enforcers to present a terror suspect to a judge for formal charging three days
after arrest is unconstitutional.132 To stop a terrorist attack, however, law
enforcers may have to travel to remote locations on distant islands, and
transportation delays may slow the delivery of a suspect to judicial
authorities for formal charging. 133 Because of this reality, the HSA’s
authorization of a three-day detention before presentment for charging seems
reasonably necessary.
The HSA’s delayed presentment does not seem overly oppressive.
First, the narrowness of codifying an express limit of three days explicitly
cabins the duration of oppression. Second, the HSA requires law enforcers
to present a person suspected of the crime of terrorism to a judge in the
jurisdiction where the arrest occurred before subjecting that person to
131
An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep.
Act 9372 § 2 (2007) (Phil.).
132
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133
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http://web.archive.org/web/20071022221129/http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/general.asp (last visited Oct. 5,
2009).

206

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 19 NO. 1

custodial confinement.134 Third, the HSA explicitly requires that this judge
determine whether the law enforcers misused their power and whether
national security concerns merit custodial confinement. 135 Cumulatively,
these conditions keep the harshness of the HSA’s detention measure within
reasonable limits.
b.

House Arrest

Second, the petitioners argue the HSA’s authorization for house arrest
and restricted communication, despite little evidence of guilt, is
unconstitutional.136 After a prosecutor formally charges a suspect with the
crime of terrorism, the HSA permits a court to confine the defendant to
house arrest and to restrict his or her access to electronic communications.137
Because many will die if a terrorist attack is successful and the recipients of
electronic communications are difficult to vet, confining an accused to his or
her home without access to electronic communications while the case is
pending seems reasonably necessary to stop a suspected attack. The
existence of strong or weak evidence does not detract from the criticality of
this measure.
The narrowness of the HSA’s authorization for house arrest with
restricted communication also limits undue oppression. While the HSA
allows for a lower burden of proof to justify the implementation of this
measure, the anti-terror law requires judicial determination to execute the
procedure. 138 This judicial oversight and required authorization serve to
limit undue oppression from political bias. Furthermore, the HSA demands
that restrictions cease “upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal
of the case.”139 This durational cap, bounded by standard trial procedures,
places a firm ceiling on the scope of oppression. Therefore, the HSA’s
provisions that authorize house arrest with restricted access to electronic
communications seem reasonably necessary and not overly oppressive.
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Search and Seizure

Third, the petitioners assert the HSA unconstitutionally permits
arbitrariness and undue oppression because it authorizes law enforcers to
conduct wiretaps and to examine or seize an individual’s financial assets.140
The HSA specifically requires a court of appeals to approve a search and
seizure of a suspected terrorist’s communications and monetary assets. 141
This process is distinguishable from that in Executive Order 626-A, which
was found unconstitutional in Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals.142
Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals involved police confiscation of
the petitioner’s carabaos143 because the petitioner violated Executive Order
626-A. 144 Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of carabaos
between provinces. 145 The Philippine Supreme Court concluded the
application of the law was overly oppressive because Executive Order 626-A
allowed for “violation[s] [to] have been pronounced not by the police only
but by a court of justice.”146 The Court held “[d]ue process [was] violated
because the owner of the property confiscated [was] denied the right to be
heard in his defense and [was] immediately condemned and punished.”147
The HSA is distinguishable from Executive Order 626-A because the
HSA does not allow police autonomously to condemn a violator. The HSA
demands that an appellate court judge determine the reasonableness of a
search or seizure before police execution.148 Therefore, because the HSA
relies on the independent and impartial discretion of a senior judicial officer
to ensure that invasive procedures are not overly oppressive before police
execution, the HSA, unlike Executive Order 626-A, is within constitutional
limits.
140
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The HSA Intrinsically Protects Against Undue Oppression

The HSA also provides explicit duties for and punishments on
government officials, which limit the law from being used in an overly
oppressive manner. Before enactment of the HSA, the military was the
government’s main tool to eradicate terrorism.149 Unlike the military, which
had few checks on its decision-making outside the chain-of-command, the
HSA empowers police through a limited grant of power. Thirty of the HSA’s
sixty-two provisions limit police discretion, which in turn limits the potential
for misuse of power and undue oppression. 150 The legislative history
provides that the rationale supporting the limited grant of power was “to
discourage [government] accusations . . . [and to] help compel the
authorities to make certain that . . . [o]nly charges . . . backed [with] solid
evidence [would] be used as [the] basis for the detention of persons accused
of terrorism.”151
The HSA’s specific punishments and protections include, inter alia, a
monetary sanction “of P500,000 for every day in detention of a person
falsely accused of terrorism;”152 a ten- to twelve-year imprisonment sentence
on law enforcers who fail to notify judicial authorities as prescribed;153 and
protected privileged communications between “lawyers and clients, doctors
and patients, journalists and their sources, and confidential business
correspondence.”154 The HSA also created a legal grievance committee to
receive and evaluate complaints against law enforcers; 155 created a
congressional oversight committee to review the law one year after its
implementation; 156 and delegated authority to the Commission on Human
Rights to give the highest priority to investigating and prosecuting civil and
political rights violations. 157 Therefore, while the HSA grants expanded
authority to law enforcers in the areas of preventative detention, house
arrest, and search and seizure, the HSA forestalls potential undue oppression
by explicitly providing significant protections to suspected lawbreakers and
149
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witnesses from governmental misuse of power. 158 The following section
examines prong three of the due process test.
3.

A Reasonable Relation Exists Between the Purposes of the HSA and
the Means Adopted

The HSA also passes the last prong of the due process test: The
HSA’s preventative detention, house arrest, and search and seizure measures
are reasonably related to the law’s purpose. Subpart a) analyzes whether the
HSA’s preventative detention provisions are reasonably related to the
purpose of stopping terrorism; Subpart b) examines the HSA’s house arrest
provisions; and Subpart c) looks at the HSA’s search and seizure measures.
a.

Preventative Detention

First, preventative detention of a terror suspect is not a prima facie
unconstitutional deprivation of an individual’s right to travel. The Philippine
Constitution provides that “the right to travel [shall not] be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.” 159
Stopping a terrorist attack falls under this ambit. The Revised Penal Code,
since its inception in 1930, has also authorized preventative detention. 160
With increase in the severity of the crime and punishment, the Revised Penal
Code has authorized increasing preventative detention times. 161 As a
terrorist act is a crime of immense severity, the history of preventative
detention in Revised Penal Code shows a longstanding practice that supports
the reasonableness of the HSA’s three-day preventative detention.162
b.

House Arrest

Second, the HSA permits a court to confine a suspected terrorist to
house arrest without access to electronic communications.163 It is widely
158
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known that electronic communications may be used to trigger the detonation
of an explosive device.164 In November 2007, four people, including two
Philippine congressmen, died from a bomb packed with nails that was
detonated from afar by a cell phone. 165 Therefore, limiting a suspected
terrorist’s ability to detonate a blast seems reasonably related to stopping a
suspected attack.
c.

Search and Seizure

Sources of domestic and international law manifest the reasonableness
of the relation between the HSA’s search and seizure authorizations and
fighting terrorism. The HSA permits law enforcers who have court
authorization to search and seize a suspected terrorist’s financial assets.166
Other sources of Philippine and international law that permit similar
invasive measures illustrate that a limited and court authorized intrusion into
a suspected terrorist’s financial matters is reasonably related to stopping a
terrorist attack.167 For example, the Philippine Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 2001 (“AMLA”) allows government officials to examine and freeze bank
deposits to prevent the crime of money laundering, a known source of
financing for terrorist activities.168 Also, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (“ASEAN”) Regional Forum, which manages collective Southeast
Asian regional anti-terrorism measures, called upon member countries169 to
adhere to its Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing.170 This
ASEAN dictate required member countries to search and seize terrorists’
financial assets as a means to effectively fight terrorism.171 Additionally, the
Financial Action Task Force, an inter-governmental organization,
“recognized as the international standard setter for anti-money laundering
(AML) efforts,” finds that money laundering is fundamentally linked to
164
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funding terrorists.172 Accordingly, it is reasonable that the HSA permits law
enforcers, after a judge has weighed the intrusion against the suspect’s right
of privacy and granted authorization, to identify the character of financial
assets and to seize these assets if they would likely support terrorist
activities.
The HSA also authorizes wiretaps.173 The Philippine Republic Act
Number 4200, also known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (“AWTL”),
supports the reasonableness of the HSA’s authorization for law enforcers to
conduct wiretaps on suspected terrorists. 174 Since 1965, the AWTL has
permitted Philippine governmental authorities, when authorized by a court
order, to wiretap a suspect in order to stop a crime “against national
security.”175 The longevity of this practice illustrates its reasonable relation
to stopping a crime against national security. Likewise, the HSA’s near
identical authorization is reasonably related to stopping a terrorist attack—a
crime against national security. Next, the HSA’s substantive police measures
are analyzed against the Philippine Supreme Court’s interpretation of
international law.
B.

The Philippine Supreme Court Is Likely to Find the HSA’s Measures
Lawful Under International Law

Prominent skeptical voices such as Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists (“ICJ”) voiced concern that the HSA
may violate the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).176 The ICCPR, a multilateral treaty that the Philippines ratified
172
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in 1986,177 memorializes the protection of fundamental human rights.178 In a
letter to the Philippine Senate, the Director of the ICJ’s Global Security and
Rule of Law Programme posited that the HSA’s surveillance provisions may
not contain enough safeguards to protect against violation of the ICCPR’s
Article 17. 179 Article 17 protects against arbitrary privacy intrusions by
providing, “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.”180 Because Article II of the Philippine Constitution
states the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations,”181
the Philippine Supreme Court may conduct an analysis of the HSA with
regard to international law. 182 Based on precedential Philippine case law
related to the ICCPR, the Philippine Supreme Court is likely to find the HSA
in good standing. This section first explains the legal construct behind
analyzing Philippine Supreme Court case law to understand international
law, then examines two precedential Philippine cases, and finds the HSA
lawful.
The theory of international legal pluralism provides the construct to
examine how the Philippine Supreme Court would most likely analyze the
HSA against international law. A pluralist understanding of international law
helps to explain the phenomenon that various supreme courts may interpret
the same concept differently. 183 A pluralistic view of international law
recognizes that just as “the simplest legal regimes are constituted by a
plurality of decision-making institutions,” 184 the global stage is likewise
comprised of various countries that interpret legal concepts differently. The
pluralist viewpoint requires distinction between the law as applied in a
sovereign land by the sovereign’s courts and a “single global law that
177
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‘embraces the totality of a group of items.’”185 In light of this difference,
this section analyzes the HSA with regard to the Philippine Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the ICCPR.
Two Philippine Supreme Court cases suggest the Philippine Supreme
Court would interpret the ICCPR to support a subordination of individual
liberties for reasons of national security.186 In both cases, petitioners asked
the Philippine Supreme Court to strike laws based on alleged transgression
of international law. The first case, Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Raul
Manglapus, involved a law that restricted personal travel.187 The Philippine
Supreme Court held that while Article 12 of the ICCPR protects the “right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence,” such rights may
be restricted by laws that “are necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health or morals . . .” or the separate rights and freedom of
others.188 The second case, Bayan v. Eduardo Ermita, was a challenge to a
statute that restricted individuals’ right to assemble. 189 In Ermita, the
Philippine Supreme Court held the right of peaceful assembly is both
guaranteed and limited. 190 Finding support in Article 19 of the ICCPR,
which allows a nation state to deny assembly “on grounds of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health,” the Philippine Supreme Court concluded that a law
limiting the right to assemble for reason of national security was “not a
violation of the right but a valid restriction of its exercise.”191 Both these
cases demonstrate that the Philippine Supreme Court concluded the ICCPR
permits the restriction of protected liberties to ensure the maintenance of
national security and public order.192
185
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Manglapus and Ermita support the argument that a reasonable
subordination of privacy under the HSA to prevent acts of terrorism is also
justified by the need to protect national security. In Manglapus and in
Ermita, the Philippine Supreme Court restricted individuals’ rights of liberty
of movement and assembly,193 which are no less important than the right of
privacy. However, in Articles 12 and 19, the ICCPR specifically provides
that movement and assembly may be restricted for reasons of national
security. 194 Article 17, conversely, protects individuals’ privacy from
“arbitrary or unlawful interference” from the government, but does not, like
Articles 12 and 19, provide for the express exception of national security. 195
The HSA nevertheless complies with Article 17 because the anti-terror law
requires before-the-fact judicial authorization. 196 The before-the-fact
judicial authorization in the HSA forestalls arbitrary or unlawful
interference, while facilitating protection of the Philippine national security.
Therefore, Manglapus and Ermita illustrate that if the Philippine Supreme
Court employs its previous analyses, it will interpret the HSA’s restriction on
individual liberties as in conformance with the letter and spirit of the ICCPR.
The following section examines policy considerations of the HSA.
V.

THE HSA IS GOOD POLICY BECAUSE IT STRENGTHENS DEMOCRATIC
IDEALS

Most national anti-terror laws have been part of a larger political
effort to create a broad international response to fighting terrorism.197 In the
wake of the September 11th attacks in the U.S., the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 1373, which required criminalization of terrorist acts and
terrorist financing.198 Most countries enacted new laws or modified current
ones to largely permit political branches of government to determine the
193
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proper balance between individual liberty and collective security. 199 The
HSA did not follow this trend. Rather, the HSA innovatively required
Philippine courts to supervise and to ensure lawful practices by agents of the
political branches of government.
In drafting the HSA, the Philippine lawmakers abstained from
defining terrorism and instead listed which acts may be punishable under
certain circumstances as acts of terrorism. 200 By defining a punishable
terrorist act as requiring the existence of “widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand,”201 the HSA granted the Philippine judiciary sole
discretion to decide which acts are punishable under terrorist liability.
Assuming that Philippine judges are impartial and insulated from political
bias, the HSA’s allocation of adjudicative decision-making to the judiciary
and away from the political branches, in theory, adheres to the doctrine of
the separation of powers.
This structure strengthens the
compartmentalization of power within the Philippine government and
provides for a legal check on executive abuse of power.
The HSA also serves democratic ideals through the reviewability of
the judicial process. In 2008, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled on the
supremacy of the writs of amparo and habeas data.202 The Court declared
that the writ of amparo is “a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act . . . of a public official . . . [regarding] extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.” 203 The writ of habeas data also applies to all
aggrieved parties “whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act . . . of a public official . . . engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”204 Unlike
the secrecy surrounding the pre-HSA extrajudicial killings, the HSA makes
199
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the prosecution of terrorists a transparent matter that proceeds under the
supervision of the Philippine judiciary. Also, actions executed under the
HSA do not trump the writs of amparo or habeas data, so individual liberties
may always be aggrieved through judicial recourse. This opportunity for
review strengthens the democratic ideal of “a government of the people, by
the people.”205
VI.

CONCLUSION

Challenged with enduring struggles for secession and growing
terrorist networks, the Philippine Congress drafted the HSA to distinguish
between punishing terrorists and punishing secessionists. To punish a
person under the HSA, a court must decide precisely when the actus reus
accompanied the requisite attendant circumstances and whether there existed
the required specific intent. The HSA accomplishes its purpose of
safeguarding the Philippine people from terrorist acts by expressly
enumerating which actions are punishable, while allowing the judiciary to be
the impartial bearer of the sword.
The HSA is beneficial for Philippine democracy because it pivoted the
country’s anti-terrorism policy toward the protection of human rights. The
Philippine legislature crafted the HSA in part to curb governmental abuse:
thirty of the HSA’s sections expressly punish governmental overreaching.
Philippine Senator Pimentel reflected on the HSA’s dual purpose in his note
that when read separately, sections of the HSA “may cause an intense
societal anxiety,” but when read as a whole, “the readers may well find that
there are remedies embedded in the Act that uphold the people’s human
rights and civil liberties and afford them some defense from an oppressive
government.”206 Thus, the HSA strengthens Philippine democracy because it
facilitates the curbing of terrorism through the judiciary’s ensuring that the
law is applied suaviter in modo, fortiter in re—gently in manner, strongly in
deed.
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